Eloquent silences: silence and dissent by Tanesini, Alessandra
1 
 
Eloquent Silences: Silence and Dissent 
 
A Tanesini 
Cardiff University 
Draft 23 September 2017 
Do not cite without previous permission from the author 
 
Abstract: Partly in response to the imperative that we disclose information about ourselves, 
individuals are increasingly turning to silence as a means to protest, refuse and resist. Yet, 
there is to my knowledge no existing philosophical account of silence as communicative act 
of dissent. This paper has three main goals. The first is to fill the lacuna in the existing 
philosophical literature by showing that silence can be an illocution which is used to 
communicate. In other words, silence can be eloquent. The second is to argue that silence 
when eloquent is not usually expressive of acceptance. Instead it often signals that 
something is awry with the ongoing conversational exchange. The third is to identify some 
features of eloquent silences that explain their effectiveness, in some contexts, in 
expressing dissent. 
 
 
A political dissident is interrogated. She is asked time and again to reveal the names of other 
activists. In response, she remains silent. A black man narrates his experiences of racial 
discrimination to a white audience. No one interrupts him. When he finishes, his audience is 
silent, still, showing no signs of emotion. Hundreds of students sit silent on the ground, 
motionless forming a path from the entrance of a University building. Through them moves 
a woman, looking nervous, who is being followed by reporters.1 These, and many more, are 
things we do with silence. Some of them are ways in which dissent can be “voiced”. 
It is prima facie plausible to think that these silences are effective communicative 
acts and to take the silences they involve to be examples of illocutions such as protesting, 
                                                          
1 This protest was organised in 2011 at UC Davis by students objecting to the decisions made by the University 
Chancellor to call the campus police in response to previous protests (Cf., Hatzisavvidou 2015). 
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refusing or dissenting.2, 3 Further, it is commonplace in linguistics and in political theory to 
accept that some silences are propositionally meaningful (e.g., Tannen and Saville-Troike 
1995; Ferguson 2003; Ephratt 2008). Yet, there is, to my knowledge, no philosophical 
discussion of this phenomenon. Whilst it is widely acknowledged in the philosophical 
literature that speech acts can be performed silently, the examples which are considered 
involve body language or other physical gestures. There is no discussion of the 
communicative potential of silence itself. 
This lacuna is particularly troubling given the recent prominence of silence as a tool 
of dissent. Until the 1990s’ silence has often been equated with powerless or acquiescence. 
The Act Up slogan “Silence = death” was indicative of this approach (Cf., Ferguson 2003). In 
recent years, however, uses of silence as a means of resistance or protest have proliferated. 
For instance since 1996 in April every year the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network 
(GLSEN) in the USA holds a day of silence in schools to express solidarity with gay and 
lesbian students and to raise ‘awareness about the silencing effect of anti-LGBT bullying, 
harassment and discrimination’ (GLSEN 2017; cf., Woolley 2012). Silent demonstrations 
have been held in Iran in 2009 protesting against perceived widespread electoral fraud 
(Ranjbar 2017); in Ecuador against the mining of rain forests (Fitz-Henry 2016); and in 
Mexico against the violence that pervades the lives of indigenous people (Carmona 2014). In 
Turkey, a performance artist began in 2013 a silent protest against Prime Minister Erdogan. 
He soon became known as the standing man and hundreds joined him in silent protest 
(Seymour 2013). 
There are several likely causes for the rise in popularity of silence as a way of 
dissenting. Prominent among them is increased awareness that we live in a society where 
individuals are on a daily basis mandated to disclose personal information to authorities and 
institutions. Citizens are thus often confronted with officials, impersonal forms or websites, 
whose task is to make individuals produce speech about themselves, and that succeed in 
eliciting such speech whilst bypassing, undermining, or overriding the agent’s will. In other 
                                                          
2 My focus is on literal silence. Some of the sociological literature on silence is concerned with elephants in the 
room. These are taboo topics about which people are silent whilst being extremely loquacious (Cf., Zerubavel 
2006). I shall ignore these cases.  
3 Since silence does not use language, it is awkward to refer to some silences as speech acts. In what follows I 
avoid this tension by using “illocutions” rather than “speech acts” to refer to units of conversation. The two 
terms are used interchangeably by others (e.g., Green 2015, p. 6). 
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words, we live in societies in which citizens frequently have their speech extracted from 
them (McKinney 2016).4 In addition, social media such as Facebook or Twitter nudge their 
users to make public personal information about the minutiae of their daily lives. Within this 
context it is hardly surprising that choosing silence becomes a way of withdrawing and 
dissenting.5 
This paper has three main goals. The first is to fill the lacuna in the existing 
philosophical literature by showing that silence can be an illocution which is used to 
communicate. In other words, silence can be eloquent.6 The second is to argue that silence 
when eloquent is not usually expressive of acceptance. Instead, it often signals that 
something is awry with the ongoing conversational exchange. The third is to identify some 
features of eloquent silences that explain their effectiveness, in some contexts, in 
expressing dissent.  
 
 
1. Eloquent Silences 
 
The aim of this section is to provide an account of eloquent silences which I define as 
silences that (a) are illocutions and (b) are intended to communicate. I also show that 
silences of this kind are commonplace. I begin this section by explaining what I mean by 
silence in order to exclude sign and body language. Subsequently, I consider different kinds 
of silence before focusing on some which seem intuitively to be eloquent. Using both 
Gricean and one non-Gricean account of illocutions, I show that there are some silences that 
fit neatly these accounts. I note that interlocutors’ recognition of the communicative 
intentions of those who keep silent often depend in part on the fact that silences are often 
adjacent to other speech acts to which they respond such as a question, a greeting, or a 
                                                          
4 Some forms of speech extractions are unjust, whilst others are unproblematic. Speech which is elicited by 
coercion or manipulation is paradigmatic of the first kind. 
5 Silence also stands in contrast to the noise characteristic of contemporary lives in which we are bombarded 
with advertising, music, the web, television and the printed press. 
6 I owe the expression to Michal Ephratt (2008). 
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request. Finally, I argue that whilst some eloquent silences adhere to Grice’s Cooperative 
Principle, others flout, violate or opt out of it.7  
Before I can contrast eloquent silences with other silences that do not communicate, 
I need to provide a characterisation of silence in general. For my purposes here, some 
behaviours which are not vocal are nevertheless not silence because they constitute 
linguistic or verbal behaviour which deploys non-acoustic means of communication. These 
behaviours include: writing, sign-language, and communication by means of gestures. Even 
though they can be carried out silently, these communications are verbal (Cf., Saville-Troike 
1995, p. 5); they are not silence. Silence, then, is non-acoustic behaviour which is also non-
verbal. 
Even if we restrict our focus to silence so characterised, there are silences that are 
not communicative. Some of these silences are extraneous to conversations; others 
facilitate conversation without communicating anything themselves. First, silences that 
occur outside communicative exchanges include the silence of a person who is asleep, or of 
strangers sitting side by side in the reading room of a library. They also include silences 
caused by external forces that prevent one from speaking such as the silence that follows a 
loud noise, but also the silence of someone who is locutionarily silenced and thus rendered 
unable to speak.8 These are all silences which are outside communicative events. Of course, 
whilst some may be innocuous, others - such as those resulting from locutionary silencing - 
are generally harmful.  
Second, there are also silences which are part of conversations, and enable 
communication, but still have themselves no communicative function. These include pauses 
in speech to swallow or breathe, to find the right words or to decide what to say. Another 
kind of silence, which enables communication but is not itself part of it, is the silence of 
listeners that allow the speakers’ words to be heard. Ritualised silences that serve to 
intensify the significance of speech in religious or spiritual ceremonies such as Quakers’ 
                                                          
7 Grice distinguishes four ways of failing to fulfil a conversational maxim and thus to adhere to the Cooperative 
Principle. One may quietly violate the maxim and thus mislead one’s interlocutors. One may opt out and 
indicate that one is unwilling to cooperate. There may be a clash between different maxims so that they 
cannot all be fulfilled. Finally, one may make a public display of failing to fulfil a maxim and so flout it. This 
latter situation often generates implicatures (Grice 1989, p. 30). 
8 A person is locutionarily silenced if she is literally prevented from carrying out the locutionary act of uttering 
words; for example, if she is gagged (Langton 1993). 
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meetings may also be thought to enable communication by framing or foregrounding it 
(Saville-Troike 1995).9 
Third, there are silences which can be taken as evidence of the mental state of the 
silent person without being themselves communicative acts. These are exemplified, for 
instance, by long hesitations which may be interpreted as evidence of indecision, or of 
thoughtfulness; they may also be read as indicating that what one is about to say is painful 
or otherwise hard to express. These silences are sources of information. Generally, 
however, they are not communicative acts.10 
These silences are not communicative because there is nothing that the speaker 
means in being silent. Thus, a forteriori, there is no meaning that they intend to 
communicate. That is, whilst it seems possible to illocute without intending to have an 
effect on any audience (Davis 1992); one cannot purport to communicate without this 
intention. Yet, plausibly enough, in all cases considered so far, the silent individual does not 
even mean anything by her silence. 
We can defend this claim in different ways depending on our preferred account of 
speaker’s meaning. Given Grice’s account, speaker’s meaning requires that one intends to 
have an effect on one’s audience (Grice 1957). This intention seems absent in many of the 
examples discussed above. In others, such as the silence of the audience which allows the 
words of the speaker to be heard, the silent individual intends to have an effect on the 
audience, but they do not necessarily intend that their interlocutors recognise their 
intentions. The claim also stands if we adopt a different account of illocution. For instance, 
Mitchell Green (2007) has argued that speaker’s meaning requires that one intends to make 
publicly manifest one’s commitment to a content and also to make this intention publicly 
manifest. This self-reflexive intention is absent in the examples of silence under 
                                                          
9 Alternatively, one may think of these silences as being part of the communicative exchanges. Nothing much 
hangs on this in my paper as I shall not discuss ceremonial or ritualised silences. 
10 There may be cases when a person does communicate through a sustained hesitation. My point here is that 
at least some hesitations are not instances of communication, although they provide interlocutors with 
evidence of a person’s mental state. 
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consideration. The person who hesitates, and whom we may interpret as pained, may not 
intend to manifest any commitment.11 
In this paper, I do not discuss the kinds of silence that I have briefly described so far. 
Instead, I am interested in silences that, on the face of it, are eloquent because they 
communicate something to interlocutors. Such silences are usually instances of elicited 
illocutions or example of resisting elicitation.12 Silences can enact many different illocutions. 
Prominent among these are refusals to be drawn into some conversations and 
announcements that one is opting out of an existing one.  
Students remaining silent in the face of a teacher’s invitation to speak are examples 
of refusals to be drawn into a conversation. Such silences can be expressions of boredom, 
lack of engagement, or absent-mindedness;13 often, they are also attempts to undermine 
teachers’ authority by challenging their entitlement to demand students’ participation. 
These silences are aptly described by Perry Gilmore as non-submissive subordinate sulks 
(1995 pp. 148-50). Individuals, who stop contributing to a conversation by pointedly keeping 
silent, announce their opting out. Such silences, especially when prolonged over time and 
directed at particular individuals, are an effective mean of ostracising people by giving them 
the silent treatment. 
Eloquent silences can also be moves within on-going conversations. They can express 
agreement as in the example of a congregation’s silence at a Christian wedding ceremony 
after the minister has proclaimed that if anyone knows of any impediment to the marriage, 
he or she must immediately say so. They can function as answers to questions; for instance, 
when a person keeps silent after a friend’s query: ‘Are you still mad at me?’.14 They can be 
invitations as exemplified by short silences marking turn-taking in conversation when a 
speaker gives the floor to a hearer inviting him to speak. But they can also be acts of 
                                                          
11 There are other instances where hesitations may be eloquent because the silent person intends her silence 
to show her pain and to make that intention itself manifest to her interlocutors. 
12 Elicited speech is speech which one utters to fulfil the communicative and perlocutionary intentions of 
another speaker which are directed towards oneself. A communicative intention is an intention to change a 
person’s beliefs (partly at least) through his recognition that this is one’s intention. A perlocutionary intention 
is an intention to make another person do something partly through his recognition of one’s intentions. See 
McKinney (2016, pp. 267-71) for this notion of elicitation. 
13 Sometimes being able to show disengagement without penalty is one of the privileges of so-called white 
silence (DiAngelo 2012 p. 7). 
14 I borrow the example from Saville-Troike (1995, p. 9) 
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resistance, refusal or protest. These include: the silence of silent protesters; that of the 
person who resists or deflects interrogation; and also, at least in some cases, white silence 
in response to black’s autobiographical narratives of discrimination.15 
In addition, some silences that make one’s emotional state manifest are also 
eloquent moves within a conversation. I noted above that long silent hesitations need not 
be communicative. However, if one noticeably hesitates before speaking and that hesitation 
is unusually long, then it is plausible that one’s silence is communicative.16 For instance, a 
person may hesitate with the intention that her silence makes it publicly discernible that she 
is still thinking about the answer, and also with the intention that it is publicly discernible 
that her intention is to make manifest that she is still thinking about the answer. This 
hesitation is an action which is overt because it results from the self-referential intention to 
make the agent’s commitment to a content manifest and to make this very intention also 
publicly observable (Green 2007, p. 66). In being silent in this way a speaker means that she 
is still thinking about what to think on the topic but also, plausibly, she intends to 
communicate a request that the interlocutor gives her time to formulate her contribution to 
the conversation. 
In the remainder of this section, I argue first that eloquent silences are genuine 
illocutions in their own right. Second, I indicate that if we want to understand the content 
and illocutionary force of these silences it is often useful to view them as one element 
within an adjacency pair of speech acts. Finally, I argue that whilst there are cooperative 
silences, silence is also an extremely effective means to communicate that one is not willing 
to co-operate. 
A speech act or illocution is commonly defined as an action that can, but does not 
need to be, performed by saying that this is what one is doing. Hence, for example, one can 
promise by saying ‘I promise’, assert by saying ‘I assert’ or order by saying ‘I order’. These 
are all illocutions (Austin 1976, p. 137; Green 2007, p. 70). Since, however, we cannot 
persuade someone by saying ‘I persuade’, persuading is not an illocution but a 
perlocutionary act. It is generally accepted that illocutions can be actions that do not involve 
                                                          
15 On white silence see (DiAngelo 2012; Applebaum 2016). 
16 What counts as unusually long varies from speech community to speech community (Sacks et al. 1974). 
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the use of spoken, written or sign-language. However, examples of silent illocutions in the 
existing literature usually involve gestures or so-called body language.17 There is to my 
knowledge no philosophical literature on being silent as an illocution. Yet, without doubt 
being silent can be an intentional action. One can intend to be silent, to hesitate or to give 
someone the silent treatment. So, one may legitimately ask whether some intentional 
silences are illocutions. 
The answer, it would seem, is affirmative no matter which account of illocution one 
adopts among some prominent contenders.18 One such approach is inspired by Grice’s 
account of speaker’s meaning. In Grice’s view a speaker means something by her actions 
only if she intends (a) to produce an effect in her audience, and (b) that her intention (a) is 
recognised by her audience, but also (c) that the effect in the audience is produced (at least 
in part) as a result of the audience’s recognition of intention (a) (Grice 1957). Illocutions 
would be those actions which count as a speaker meaning something. For example, I can 
assert that p by performing an action A (e.g., uttering p) intending to make my interlocutors 
believe that p, and form that belief as a result, at least in part, of their recognition of my 
intention to make them believe that p. 
Some silences exemplify this structure. A speaker may remain quiet after having 
made some utterances intending (a) that her interlocutor believes that he is invited to 
speak, and (b) that her interlocutor recognises that (a) is her intention; but also (c) that her 
interlocutor comes to believe that he is being invited to speak partly at least because he 
recognises that this is her intention. Her silence is an invitation which communicates that it 
is the interlocutor’s turn to speak. 
Similarly, a person may keep silent for a while after a question intending that his 
audience believes that he is still thinking about the answer, and intending them to believe 
this as a result (at least in part) of their recognition of his intention. Silences of this sort are 
often also requests for more time before adding one’s contribution to the conversation. 
They are generally recognised and respected as such by interlocutors who typically wait for 
the other person to speak. Further, interlocutors’ silences are also illocutions. They would 
                                                          
17 For example, J. L. Austin noted that we can warn or protest by non-verbal means and mentioned hurling a 
tomato as a way of protesting (Austin 1976, p. 119). 
18 There are many more which I am not considering here but none seem to preclude silence being an illocution. 
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seem to be a way in which one can grant the initial request for thinking time. 19 It is thus 
possible to have a silent dialogue in which one person asks for more time before speaking 
and the other person accedes to their request. This stretch of conversation can be carried 
out without words and, at least among conversational partners who are comfortable with 
each other, without the need for gestures or body language as ways of expressing one’s 
intentions. 
A similar interpretation readily offers itself for silent challenges of authority. The 
students who publicly display non-submissive subordinate sulks choose to remain silent. In 
being silent students challenge the teacher’s authority and intend that challenge to be 
recognised by the teacher and to produce in the teacher the belief that his authority is being 
challenged (partly at least) through this recognition. It is natural to think of this case as one 
in which students mean something with their silence and successfully communicate what 
they mean. This content can be captured with expletives or described as saying: ‘I am not 
doing what you want me to do’. 
Other eloquent silences, however, do not appear to require reflexive communicative 
intentions. That is to say, in some cases the intention that the effect be produced in the 
audience partly at least as a result of the audience’s recognition that the speaker intended 
to produce it, may be absent. Grice explicitly discusses an example in which this intention is 
missing. He classifies Herod’s action of presenting Salome with the head of St John the 
Baptist on a charger as an instance of letting someone know that something is the case but 
not as an example of telling something. Herod intends to make Salome believe that St John 
the Baptist is dead. He also intends her to recognise that this is his intention. Presumably, 
she forms the belief that St John the Baptist is dead. However, her belief does not require 
that she recognises his intention to get her to believe this since she can exclusively rely on 
her own eyes (Grice 1957, p. 382). For this reason, Grice takes this not be an instance of 
speaker’s meaning. 
                                                          
19 These requests can be misunderstood. However, interlocutors seem to assume that a speaker who is silent is 
cooperative. Thus, they default to treating the silence as a request which they cooperatively accept. If the 
silence continues for too long interlocutors may explore other possibilities such as that the speaker may not 
have heard or may be refusing to continue the conversation. 
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Many silences that I have categorised as eloquent have this structure. Consider the 
person who keeps silent after a friend has asked whether she is still mad at him. This person 
intends (a) that her friend believes that she is still mad at him; she also intends (b) that he 
recognises that (a) is her intention. But she need not intend (c) that he believes that she is 
still mad at him through his recognition of her intention. She is happy enough if his belief is 
based on the observation of her behaviour rather than the recognition of her intention. 
Hence, if Grice is right, these silences too would not be examples of illocutions. 
I do not need to take a stance on this issue here, since as I have shown some silences 
do involve reflexive communicative intentions. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to hold that 
not all illocutions require that one also intends to have an effect on an audience.20 It is 
possible for someone to mean something by an utterance without thereby intending to 
communicate this meaning to anyone, not even herself.21 If this is right, Grice’s would be 
best interpreted as an account of communicative acts rather than of illocutions. In addition, 
his claim that showing or letting someone know is not communicative because it is not an 
instance of telling is also open to serious counter-examples. Suppose that, in response to an 
invitation to play squash, I show you a heavily bandaged leg. I clearly mean by that gesture 
that I cannot play. I also clearly communicate this fact to you. Yet in this case too your belief 
that I cannot play may be wholly based on an observation of the state of my leg (Schiffer 
1972, p. 56). 
These considerations have prompted some to abandon Grice’s approach in favour of 
other accounts of illocutions that do not even require that the speaker intends to produce 
an effect in her audience. For instance, Green has argued that speaker meaning is a matter 
of overtly showing one’s commitment to a content under a given illocutionary force (2007, 
p. 74). More precisely, a person S means that p with illocutionary force ϕ if and only if S 
performs an action A, intending to manifest that one’s commitment to p under force ϕ and 
that this intention is also manifest (ibid.) 
The examples of eloquent silence that I have used so far to illustrate how silence can 
be an illocution nicely fit this account. They are all examples in which someone keeps silent 
                                                          
20 Davis (1992) is often taken to have established this point conclusively. 
21 Widely discussed examples are those of people speaking in the absence of an audience or of the person 
proclaiming his innocence whilst knowing he will not be believed (Green 2007, pp. 59-63). 
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intending to make publicly discernible their commitment to some content such as ‘I need 
more time’, ‘you are not in charge’, or ‘I am still mad’ under the force of a request, a 
challenge, or an assertion.22 This intention is self-referential since it is not just the intention 
to make their commitments manifest, it is also the intention to make publicly discernible 
that that is their intention. 
I shall not try to adjudicate here between these different accounts of illocution.23 
What matters for my purposes here is that independently of which account is to be 
preferred, my discussion above shows that some silences are illocutions. It also shows that 
the same action - being silent- can constitute a plethora of different illocutions with very 
different contents. It is, therefore, hard to fathom how silent agents can make publicly 
manifest one among many different possible commitments. It is equally mysterious how 
audiences are able to recognise agents’ intentions in keeping silent. Yet, silent 
communication regularly succeeds. The most plausible explanation of this achievement is 
based on the fact that eloquent silences are often either elicited or a way of resisting 
elicitation. 
The thought that silent illocutions are produced either in order to fulfil at least some 
the intentions of the speaker whose speech elicits them, or to resist such elicitation, is 
compelling, once we consider that by themselves all silences are the same. This simple fact 
can be easily overlooked because when we think of the role of silence in conversation we 
often think of it in conjunction with distinctive gestures which are separate illocutions. If, as 
I argued above, silence itself can be an illocution, one can only account for its varied nature 
by thinking of it as an element within a structured sequence of illocutions. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the prospects of theories of 
conversation. But even those who, like Searle (1992), think there is little prospect for 
success in the search for rules or regularities that would structure conversations admit to 
the existence of notable exceptions: adjacency pairs. These are pairs of illocutions in which 
the second element is a response to the first which precedes it. Searle briefly discusses 
three groupings: questions and answers; requests that one performs a speech act and their 
                                                          
22 The nature of these contents is somewhat indeterminate. 
23 However, I return to the idea that illocutions can show their contents in sect. 3. Eloquent silences often have 
this feature. It is in my view key to their effectiveness as acts of dissent. 
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responses; offers, proposals or bets and the consequent acceptance or refusals (Searle 
1992, pp. 8-10). It is striking that the examples of eloquent silences I discussed above all 
seem to belong to one such grouping. 
One way to think about the relations between illocutions that form adjacency pairs is 
to think of the second as being elicited by the first. Following McKinney (2016) we can think 
of an illocution of a speaker A as being elicited by a speaker B’s illocution when it is 
produced by A to fulfil at least some communicative and perlocutionary intentions of B 
towards A. For example, when a person A keeps silent when a friend B asks whether she is 
still mad at him, A fulfils B’s communicative and perlocutionary intention that she answer 
his question. A can exploit this structure of elicitation to make publicly manifest her 
commitment to a specific content under a given force, whilst B’s knowledge of his own 
intentions and of A’s apparent commitment to fulfilling them allows him to recognise A’s 
intentions. 
Eloquent silences are also often acts of resisting elicitation. They are therefore 
refusals to fulfil some communicative or perlocutionary intentions directed toward the 
person who keeps silent in response. In this case also the agent can rely on a common 
understanding of the structure of elicitation to intend to make manifest her commitments. 
In this case the nature of A’s commitment is specified by the refusal to fulfil at least some of 
B’s intentions; B is able to recognise A’s intentions because he has knowledge of his own 
intentions and of A’s apparent commitment not to fulfil them. 
Eloquent silences can be co-operative or non-cooperative.24 Interestingly, they 
sometimes function as a co-operative way of announcing the end of co-operation. Grice’s 
Co-operative Principle states that one should make one’s conversational contribution ‘such 
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which [one is] … engaged’ (Grice 1989, p 26). Eloquent silences that are 
moves within on-going conversations usually satisfy the principle.25 The congregation’s 
silence is maximally informative, relevant and unambiguous. Silently requesting time to 
                                                          
24 Cooperation and the fulfilment of another’s communicative and perlocutionary intentions are related but 
are not the same. A person may be co-operative and yet frustrate another’s perlocutionary intentions. 
25 Ephratt (2012) offers several examples of silences that satisfy the principle. He is however employing a very 
capacious notion of silence including changing the topic of conversation. 
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think also satisfies the principle. One could also ask for more time by means of words to that 
effect, but doing so in most cases slows down the conversation even further. It is also not 
necessary unless one is proposing to return to the topic at a later date. Even the silence of 
the person who is still mad at us is co-operative since it unambiguously and effectively 
communicates her annoyance. 
Other eloquent silences flout the co-operative principle. None is clearer than the 
silence of the dissident and of the protester in the face of attempts to extract information, 
promises or other commitments out of them.26 In these cases the silent objector patently 
attempts not to make her contribution informative and she resists the speakers’ attempts to 
place some obligations on her. Non-subordinate submissive silences are examples of 
intermediate cases since they are informative, relevant and unambiguous negative 
responses to the request or command made by a person in authority that one performs an 
illocution. It does not seem implausible to identify them as way of marking co-operatively 
the end of one’s cooperation. These are examples of individuals who respond to attempts to 
elicit their speech by frustrating some of the perlocutionary intentions of those who 
intended to make them speak. However, their silence is cooperative since it is relevant, 
informative and unambiguous. 
 
2. Silence as assent and as acceptance 
Recently Philip Pettit (2002) and Sandford Goldberg (2016; 2018; MS) have argued 
that, barring the presence of defeaters, speakers are entitled to presume that silent 
interlocutors accept what speakers have said.27,28 In this section, I take issue with this view. 
Instead, I argue that even if we grant that audiences have a defeasible obligation to make 
their dissent manifest, it does not follow that such disagreement cannot be communicated 
                                                          
26 That said, one could argue that the principle should not apply to these cases since these are not talk 
exchanges with agreed purpose or direction. 
27 There is a growing literature on silencing following Langton’s now classic (1993). The issue of silencing is 
however orthogonal to my concern here since it highlights how some people’s contributions to debate are 
blocked or undermined. 
28 The notion of acceptance here is weaker than that of belief. The interlocutor may accept a claim for the 
purpose of the on-going conversation without believing it. 
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by means of silence. In particular, I show that at least when silence is eloquent, it cannot be 
presumed by default to communicate assent.29 
It may be instructive to consider first examples where silence is eloquent and 
communicates assent. Goldberg mentions the so-called “tacit acceptance procedure” used 
by some committees when ratifying reports. Given this procedure, documents are tacitly 
accepted unless someone explicitly raises an objection before a pre-set deadline (MS, p. 7). 
Silence in these cases may not be wholly freely chosen, but it communicates assent, as does 
the silence of the congregation when it has been directed by the minister to speak out 
against the marriage or forever acquiesce to its legitimacy. We should not, however, draw 
any general conclusion based on these examples alone since they essentially rely on speech 
acts known as directives.  
The priest during the wedding ceremony instructs the audience either to speak up or 
accept the marriage. The minister’s illocution is thus a directive which is a speech act that 
tries to get the hearers to do something (Searle 1976, p. 11) or that lays some obligation on 
them (See Alston 2000, pp. 97-8). It is, thus, plausible to conclude that the reason why 
silence in this instance communicates assent is that members of congregation have acquired 
a special responsibility to state presently any objections they may harbour. The same 
considerations apply to tacit acceptance procedures. These silences are forms of assent 
because they are responses to specific directives. These examples of eloquent silences 
provide no evidence for the view that silence following an assertion also communicates 
acceptance. 
In addition, there are situations where silence following an assertion overtly 
communicates disapproval.30 One is discussed by Grice in the context of failures to fulfill the 
submaxim relating to making one’s contribution relevant to the conversation. Grice 
considers the case of a person who, at a tea party, states that ‘Mrs X is an old bag’. The 
claim is followed by silence which Grice describes as ‘appalled’. Then one interlocutor 
continues the conversation by changing the topic to a discussion of the weather (1989, p. 
                                                          
29 I shall not consider here the broader question whether other kinds of silences which are not themselves 
communicative can be presumed to indicate assent. 
30 Overtness requires a self-referential intention to make a commitment to a content manifest and to also 
make this very intention manifest. 
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35). Grice focuses on the change of subject, but the silence that precedes it is also a 
conversational move. The interlocutor’s silence communicates her consternation about the 
speaker’s claim. It conveys, by showing that one refuses to engage with it, that the speaker’s 
comment should not be dignified with a response (Ephratt 2012, pp. 65-6). 
Further, it is not altogether clear that Grice is right to maintain that the appalled 
interlocutor violates the Co-operative Principle by not making her contribution relevant. 
Arguably, one may claim instead that the initial remark is out of order. Rude comments are 
unacceptable given the purposes of polite conversation at tea parties. Thus, it is the original 
speaker who is un-cooperative, whilst the interlocutor’s silence is co-operatively helpful by 
trying to steer the conversation back to its initially agreed purpose (ibid., p. 66). Hence, at 
times, pointed silence is the clearest, most coherent and helpful way, of communicating to a 
speaker that some remark of his is beyond the pale. 
This example brings into relief some unwarranted assumptions in the arguments in 
favour of the view that the default, albeit defeasible, interpretation of silence following an 
assertion is acceptance. First, these arguments fail to distinguish clearly deliberate silence 
from a failure to remark on a specific claim. Second, they appear to presume that 
disagreement can only be conveyed by saying something. That is, they ignore the possibility 
that silence may communicate dissent. Third, they overlook the possibility that the initial 
speaker’s contribution may itself be uncooperative. 
To substantiate these charges, I need to give a flavour of the position I wish to 
oppose. According to this view, it is a feature of the practice of assertion that any claim 
made in a conversation, which is not challenged, is accepted by default; it, thus, becomes 
part of the background presuppositions of that linguistic exchange. Therefore, it is 
incumbent on the interlocutors to block the addition of a new assertion to the common 
ground or to the conversational score of the conversation, if they object to it. 31 If they fail to 
act, the assertion is accepted.  
                                                          
31 Those who discuss this feature of the practice of assertion usually develop it either in terms of Stalnaker’s 
notion of a common ground (1999; 2002) or David Lewis’ notion of a conversational score (1979). These are 
different ways of explaining kinematically changes in what is taken to be accepted or permitted in an evolving 
conversation. 
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Although I have reservations about it (Tanesini 2016), I do not wish in this paper to 
challenge the thesis that assertions are accepted by default. Instead, I want to challenge the 
claim that silence cannot be a rejection of an assertion. Defenders of the view that silence 
indicates acceptance do not address this issue head on. Instead, they ignore this possibility 
because its existence is obscured by two unargued but related presumptions. One is the 
assumption that silence may indicate something but says nothing. This neglect of eloquent 
silences makes it difficult to recognise the difference between keeping silent and not 
remarking upon a claim. Yet, whilst keeping silent is an act, not remarking upon a claim is 
best thought of as an omission. This second assumption that silence is always an omission 
rather than an act generates the tendency to conflate what are clearly distinct phenomena: 
one is omitting to say anything about a claim, often by saying something which continues 
the conversation; the other is keeping silent when one is invited to speak or is at least in a 
position to do so. 
The interlocutor in the first case, by indicating his willingness to continue the 
conversation as normal, indicates his assent. The person who is deliberately keeping silent, 
instead, indicates that something is amiss with the conversation which, therefore, cannot 
continue as normal. It may be worth noting in this regard how awkward silence often is in 
conversation. Silence is uncomfortable because it often marks the fact that things are not 
going well with the conversational exchange.32 Hence, it does not seem plausible that 
deliberate silence marks agreement. What may mark agreement is behaviour that indicates 
that all is well with the conversation. Such behaviour includes contributing to it without 
remarking upon, or drawing attention to, previous contributions in critical or negative ways. 
In addition, those who take silence defeasibly to indicate assent overlook how 
frequently silence is used to express overtly, and make public, one’s dissent. One of the 
reasons why the prevalence of dissenting silence might have been overlooked is the focus 
on disagreement understood as having doubts about the truth of a claim, or believing it to 
be false. But disagreement may take different forms. One may object to an assertion 
because of the discriminatory vocabulary it deploys. One’s censure of slurs or hate speech is 
not primarily based on their falsity but on the harms they cause (and perhaps constitute). 
                                                          
32 This is not always so, however. The ability to maintain silence without discomfort is often a sign of intimacy. 
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Thus, when confronted with such speech one may want to contest the legitimacy of uttering 
the words, rather than challenge the veracity of the assertion. That is, one may wish to 
reject that the oppressive speech contributes to the conversation, rather than to respond to 
it as a legitimate move which is epistemically defective.  
In this context, there is a risk that trying to offer reasons for the unacceptability of 
hate speech actually ends up giving it some legitimacy. If one treats speech of this sort as 
requiring a reply rather than as deserving to be ignored or dismissed, one can be plausibly 
taken to imply that it has made a contribution to the conversation. Plausibly, however, 
when one finds an assertion to be repugnant rather than merely false, pointed silence, that 
conveys the thought that the speaker is out of order is an effective way of distancing oneself 
from the speaker and his or her speech. 
In sum, I have shown that one may be led to think that silence by default signals 
acceptance only if one overlooks some plausible features of the use of silence in 
communication. First, silence can be an illocution. Second, silence as an illocution often, or 
even usually, marks that something is going wrong rather than well in the conversation.33 
Third, cooperation in conversation is a two-way street. Sometimes when a speaker is not 
cooperative, a helpful interlocutor will draw the speaker’s attention to the fact. Corrections 
of this sort are akin to censure or disapproval rather than to critical challenges. Silence can 
be an effective way to censure a speaker without being uncooperative. 
 
 
3 Dissident silences 
 
I have argued in the first section that silence can be eloquent. In section two I have shown 
that it is a mistake to think that silence defeasibly indicates acceptance. In this section, I 
present a non-exhaustive and partially overlapping taxonomy of eloquent silences as ways 
of expressing dissent. Subsequently, I discuss two features of dissident silence that make it a 
particularly effective tool in resisting discrimination and subordination. First, silence is more 
                                                          
33 I say ‘usually’ because silence in response to a directive may communicate assent. 
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effective than verbal criticism at expressing censure of oppressive claims. Second, since 
silence often shows what it communicates, its success as an illocution does not require that 
its target audience trusts or is especially attentive to the intentions of silent individuals. 
Whilst the speech of the dispossessed may be not be listened to, their silence is, at times, 
harder to ignore. 
Political theorists and linguists have offered different ways of categorising silence 
(Cf., Ephratt 2008; Jungkunz 2013), each suited for different purposes. Here I propose a 
different taxonomy based on the idea that the nature of silence is best understood in 
relation to those illocutions or standing conditions whose elicitation it resists. My taxonomy 
does not aim to be exhaustive or to identify mutually exclusive possibilities. Instead, my goal 
is to illustrate the variety of illocutions that can be performed by means of silence. 
The first family of eloquent silences concerns those silences in the face of directives 
that demand that one speaks. These silences are refusals to comply; they are ways of 
resisting the elicitation or even extraction of speech.34 They can constitute many illocutions 
such as defiance, refusal, resistance, protest or withdrawal. Within this category one may 
include students’ silence as a challenge to the authority of teachers by means of 
subordinate non-submissive sulks (Gilmore 1995); the resistance of the political activist 
when remaining silent during an interrogation; the refusal of some athletes to sing the 
national anthem in silent protest (Jungkunz 2012, p. 140). It also comprises many tactics 
adopted by welfare recipients to resist state surveillance through failure to report some 
income, feigning ignorance and foot dragging (Jungkunz 2012, p. 142).35 This latter kind of 
resistant silent in the face of attempts to extract information has often been used by the 
subordinated to make themselves unknown to people in position of power (Collins 1991, p. 
92).36 
                                                          
34 Speech is extracted when the elicitation undermines, bypasses or overrides the agent’s will (McKinney 
2016). 
35 These silences often are violations of the Co-operative Principle. 
36 However, some of these self-chosen silences are forms of self-censure for the purpose of self-preservation. 
Unlike cases of testimonial smothering when a speaker curtails her testimony because of her knowledge that 
the audience is not capable of genuinely hearing what she says (Dotson 2011), in these examples a speaker 
fears that her audience will use her words to harm her. Medina has argued that these silences should be 
thought of as a kind of hermeneutical injustice because the victim, even though she has the expressive 
resources to communicate her experiences, is coerced into silence (Medina 2013, pp. 101-4).  
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The second family includes those silences which are intentionally kept in contexts in 
which speech is invited or expected within some on-going conversation or debate. These 
silences are as varied as the speech that attempts to elicit them. They include silence in 
response to questions or the appalled silence of the person who thinks that what has just 
been said is out of order. To this family also belong the silences of silent protesters who 
wish to communicate their refusal to engage with institutional explanations of some event 
(Carmona 2014), and of those who wish to draw attention to those voices that are missing 
from the conversation so in order to empower them (Jungkunz 2012; Ranjbar 2017, p. 618). 
Often these silences derive their significance from the fact that they confound expectations 
and are a source of surprise.  
This second family also includes silences in response to queries that are intended to 
show that one should not be expected to be able to answer that question. This is a strategy 
of survival that has sometimes been adopted by subordinated individuals. It is, as I 
mentioned above, a way of making oneself unknown to those who can cause one harm. In 
this instance, one may keep silent to give the impression that one is slow-witted and has 
nothing to say. Such silence may be a result of the psychological damage inflicted by 
habitual silencing or it may be a conscious strategy to appear more deferential and less 
knowing than one actually is.37 
Privileged individuals adopt a similar strategy to indicate that they regard their 
ignorance of some issue to be unproblematic. Sometimes, the silence of white people in the 
context of discussions of race belongs to this category. White silence, in these instances, is 
not indicative of attentive listening. Rather, it communicates that one thinks that one should 
not be expected to know anything about the topic, and, therefore, to be able to make a 
meaningful contribution. It thus implicates that white people are blamelessly ignorant about 
race (DiAngelo 2012; Applebaum 2016). 
The third, and final, family of silences I wish to discuss concerns silence on occasions 
where there is a standing and generic expectation that speech will be present, although 
these have not been preceded by specific solicitations that one speaks. These silences too 
                                                          
37 Collins mentions some of these silences in her discussion of Afro-American women who worked as house 
servants (1991, p. 53 and pp. 142-3). 
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can be a form of protest which works by creating surprise, or discomfort, or by drawing 
attention to some of the features of the usual speech that go unnoticed until it is replaced 
with silence. Hence, for instance, silent protests in Ecuador were intended to communicate, 
by being patently different from it, that dominant public speech was toxic because of its 
reliance on strong men and alleged saviours (Fitz-Henry 2016, p. 11). Performances of 
stillness and quietness in public spaces where bustling noise is generally expected also 
communicate similar messages.38 The use of silence by teachers overtly to communicate to 
students the acceptability of patterns of speech that include long silent pauses is another 
example of silence which acquires its eloquence through defying standing expectations.39 
I hasten to add that the power of silence as a tool of dissent is not without its 
limitations. It is not a coincidence that it is primarily used by those who are powerless and 
as a weapon of last resort. It is often a strategy to deflect violent reprisals by making it 
apparent that one’s protest is peaceful, and to unify groups of demonstrators who may not 
share a common view of the alternative to the status quo (Cf., Ranjbar 2017). 
Nevertheless, silence can be a successful form of dissent. In what follows I focus on 
two of its features that promote its effectiveness in the expression of disapproval and 
disagreement. The first contributes to explaining why silence can be used to communicate 
censure and disdain. The second may be one of the reasons why silence is often chosen by 
those who are relatively powerless in a given situation.  
In the second section of this paper I have noted that even if we grant that audiences 
have a defeasible obligation to make manifest their dissent with speakers, it does not follow 
that such disagreements must be verbally communicated. Here, I want briefly to press the 
point further by arguing that silence on some occasions can be more powerful than speech 
in expressing dissent. It has been noted that oppressive speech is often hard to reverse; 
when appalling claims have been made salient, it is nearly impossible to restore the 
conversation to the point before their utterance (McGowan 2009; Simpson 2013). Those 
                                                          
38 Here belongs the silent reading of banned books in public spaces that took place in Thailand in 2014 (Fitz-
Henry 2016, p. 2) as well as the standing man’s protests in Turkey. 
39 See Montoya (2000) on the deliberate use of silence to give legitimacy to the speech habits of some minority 
communities which value silence rather than the quick fire responses adopted by other ethnic groups. 
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who have lamented this situation have often focused on verbal objections as a way of 
reversing the accommodation of moves that are oppressive.  
There are many factors that make it hard to cancel out the pernicious influence on 
conversations of speech that subordinates. In some contexts, as I have argued in section 2 
above, silence may be more effective than rational dissent. The person who verbally objects 
to oppressive speech because she engages in rational debate, indicates by her actions that 
the objectionable speech at least deserves to be treated as a contribution to the discussion. 
The person who, instead, keeps silent in response can succeed in conveying that what has 
been uttered is beyond the pale. She may thus force the initial speaker to take back what he 
said. Or, failing that, she may compel him to ignore studiously the claim he just made, if he 
wants the conversation to continue. Silence is thus a way of censuring those whose speech 
is perceived as being unacceptable. This kind of silent treatment can be used to silence 
those whose views are at odds with those of the majority. However, as I indicated above, it 
can also work as a powerful way of cancelling out some of the effects of oppressive speech. 
Finally, eloquent silences, I have argued above, often communicate by showing what 
one means by them. They communicate because they involve the intention to have an 
effect on an audience as well as the intention to make the agent’s commitment to a content 
manifest and to make this very intention also publicly observable. Further, these silences 
are instances of showing because they enact the contents that they communicate. So, the 
person who is silent, meaning that she is still mad, shows her annoyance. Her interlocutor 
can see that she is mad at him, as well as being aware of her intention to make it manifest 
that she intends to make it publicly accessible that she is still mad at him. Similarly, the 
person who keeps silent to highlight the fact that he has been silenced shows what he 
means. He intends to make public his protest that he has not been allowed to speak, and to 
also make it manifest that this is his intention. He does this by displaying the very silence to 
which he has been confined as an object for others to attend to. Metaphorically speaking, 
he displays his silence on the charger. 
Showing is in some circumstances the most effective tool because, unlike telling, it 
does not require that the target audience trusts the speaker. Ordinary acts of telling require 
that the receiver of the testimony takes the speaker to be both competent and sincere. 
However, members of subordinated groups are often, because of prejudice, not credited 
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with the amount of credibility that they are entitled to (Fricker 2007). In addition, members 
of subordinated groups also often suffer from what Mary Kate McGowan (2014) has 
identified as sincerity silencing. This occurs when speakers are not recognised as being 
sincere. Women’s refusals of sexual advances are often interpreted in this way. The person 
who makes the advance often understands the woman’s ‘no’ as a kind of refusal. But he 
does not think of her as being serious. Instead, he may presume that she is coy or playing 
the “hard to get” game. In so far as showing does not require that communicative success is 
even in part based on a recognition of the speaker’s intention or on an assessment of her 
sincerity, it is a possible way to bypass some of the negative effects of prejudice that 
prevent effective communication. 
In sum, whilst speaking out is in many contexts the most effective way of expressing 
one’s dissent from, or disagreement with, prevailing views, there are other circumstances in 
which silence is an effective way of protesting, refusing or dissenting. In these instances, 
silence can speak louder than words.40 
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